owl - 3.3.2004 - 6.10.2005

this strange survey ...

... which has been circulating through the blogs for a few days, gets its fair share here. It starts harmlessly in the comments with the usual considerations about personal data and where does the email address come from, what are the personalized links for in the "anonymous" survey - so quite normal and healthy behavior from the people.

Then at some point the providers (the Knallgrauen) jump in. And then something comes up that leaves me speechless:

And now a few personal words: I find the excitement here a bit puzzling. We (twoday.net) have always been very careful with data in the past and have always tried to be careful and act in the best interest of the users with such topics. Every day, personal rights are handled much more carelessly elsewhere and no one cares. Here, however, everyone can say how they imagine research, including beautiful publication dreams, which are unfortunately far removed from any reality.

Sorry, but what? So the concerns about the passing on of email addresses for a purpose to which the owner of the address has not explicitly consented are responded to with the flimsy argument "we are always soooo good and the others are soooo bad, and anyway, you are all dreamers"? It's quite astonishing how much arrogance can fit into a small paragraph ...

This casts a not very positive light on the relationship of the Knallgrauen to the protection of the personal data of the users. And no, a survey is nothing that is necessary for the operation - no matter how flimsy the justification with which it is pulled out by the hair.

And it was not just a slip of the tongue, as another comment from the Knallgrau direction further down proves:

in other discussions I can personally not understand the excitement about some things. Data protection is important, but not all boys are bad. So I am probably not to be counted among the cautious species, maybe I have just been lucky so far.

Yeah, yeah, data protection is always taken too seriously. Sorry, Knallgrau, but data protection is always taken too lightly, which is why such idiots like you just brush it aside. It's much more important to carry out a survey that has been planned for months (from which the visitor has nothing, but only the evaluator and the recipient of the result - just by the way) and not to cancel it because of such trivialities, as you write in the same comment:

the interesting thing about communication is that there is always too little of it. The sensitive environment (due to previous surveys) was clear to us, the survey has been planned and prepared for months (very thoroughly prepared) and we did not want to cancel the project for such reasons.

Exactly. Screw data protection concerns, they are just "such reasons" and nothing important, like, for example, another insignificant survey about the blogosphere (in which the visitor is asked about their income to improve the provider's services - ah yes) ...

EU Parliament Finally Rejects EU Council's Plan for Data Retention

The EU Parliament finally rejects the EU Council's plan for data retention - but is this a reason to celebrate?

In the area of security, the deputies have not yet had a right of co-decision, which is why their repeated rejection of the framework decision for the member states is not binding.

The Commission's counter-proposal is not much better - although the times are smaller and the compensation of the economy is addressed - but the rights of the citizens are also trampled there for a more than dubious purpose.

And we know from the fight against software patents how much we can rely on our government - they will sell us in the name of Schily or his successor ...

What does Trusted Computing have to do with Trust?

Sure, everyone knows this and it has gone through all the blogs, but the film is so nicely made that you have to link to it more often: A movie about Trusted Computing. Because the film names exactly the central point: if the industry has decided that they do not trust the user - why should the users trust the industry?

RFID in the passport is not a security feature

Tobias Straub on RFID in passports:

Straub, who as an employee of the company FlexSecure was involved in developing the signature architecture for the new passport, assessed the security properties of Basic Access Control with 56-bit keys and a passport lifespan of 10 years as insecure and the concept of a non-secure radio interface in general as unsuitable. Only the Extended Access Control, which should come with the introduction of fingerprints by the end of 2007 at the latest, would make a cryptographically secure system possible. Referring to BSI tests in which passports could be read bit-exactly from a distance of 2 meters, with error correction and additional antennas from 10 meters, Straub explained: "If I use RFID, I already have a threat with it". Compared to a contact-based SmartCard, RFID is not a security feature but an insecurity feature, said Straub, who now works at the Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology in Darmstadt.

But we are sold the nonsense of Otto Orwell as a great security facility.

Preventive telephone surveillance is not

The Constitutional Court declares preventive telephone surveillance null and void. Primarily affects Lower Saxony, but similar situations exist in other federal states. Good when something is finally put in the way of the whole surveillance fetishism.

Otto will foam again

Now he probably has to rant against the EU, as the EU Commission insists on the independence of data protection authorities:

The EU Commission has initiated a breach of contract procedure against Germany for disregarding the EU Data Protection Directive. It criticizes that the supervision of privacy protection in this country is in the hands of the state. The "current organization of the supervisory bodies responsible for monitoring data processing in the non-public sector" is "not compatible with Community law," according to a letter from the Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security available to heise online.

Whether one should take the EU Commission's sudden advocacy for data protection seriously in view of the efforts to extend storage times for communication data within the EU is a completely different matter ...

Major Eavesdropping Also in Saxony Unconstitutional

Sachsens Verfassungsgerichtshof kippt in Teilen den "Großen Lauschangriff" and of course the politicians still feel confirmed, the laws just need to be changed - sorry, but I see it differently. The mindset needs to be changed and it's a shame that the constitutional judges are not more explicit about this.

Law Enforcement Demands Access to Whois Data

Well, not being able to distinguish between IP addresses and domains, but demanding unrestricted access to WHOIS database contents. Great strategy. It's highly foolish: I can't, for the life of me, imagine a situation where the domain owner is really the interesting piece of information. On the contrary, it's almost always about IP addresses - and these are assigned to the registries and then to the providers, but these assignments are public. The assignments after that - i.e., how the providers allocate the addresses further - are not in any public-access WHOIS databases, but are stored with the providers. Let's think through a few cases:

• Illegal upload or download of protected works: To clarify such cases, you need the user's IP address and the assignment over time - because these are often dynamic addresses. The information can only be provided by the dial-up provider in whose area the IP is located. This assignment to the provider is publicly queryable via WHOIS, but everything else can only be obtained from the provider.

• Illegally operated server: The domain under which it runs is initially irrelevant - more interesting is the IP of the host on which the stuff is located. True, the domain may provide clues about co-responsible parties, but the interesting part is the IP - because you can get the hoster for the system through it, and they have records of who they provided this server to. Moreover, only the hoster can have access logs for this server, through which, for example, it could be determined which IP made the upload - and then we're back to the first case.

• Email with insults, threats, or other prohibited content: Here, the domain probably helps very little - more interesting is the IP of the servers on which the emails were packaged and delivered. Because through access logs, you can get the IP of the delivering or retrieving system and then, with the first point, get back to the user.

Sorry, but I really don't see any reason why domain data should be public or why law enforcement agencies need urgent access to the data - sure, trademark lawyers would like that, but I don't think this is about facilitating access for trademark lawyers...

To me, the whole thing sounds like another case of demands being made without a real concrete need. Just as surveillance measures without good reason are repeatedly made public - and then the investigative authorities are once again in the line of fire. It would be nice if, with all these demands from the authorities, there were concrete reasons why this demand is being made, so that one could think about real solutions to their problems - after all, the refusal to provide data is not about hindering the investigative authorities, but about ensuring data protection.

Take that, Otto!

Storing IP addresses by T-Online illegal:

As early as the hearing at the end of May, Voss had the impression that T-Online's lawyer had failed to convince the judge that storing IP addresses, in particular for billing purposes, was necessary. This assessment was confirmed in the decision made by the court.

Pass-Chips and their possible misuse

A bit older, but still interesting: Biometrics/BSI Lecture Program at CeBIT 2005. Particularly interesting are the statements about the authorization of the passport chip readers:

The ICAO standard suggests an optional passive authentication mechanism against unauthorized reading (Basic Access Control). Kügler estimated its effectiveness as only minor. However, Basic Access Control would be suitable for the facial image, as this involves only weakly sensitive data.

This is the part currently being discussed regarding the passport - the authentication of the reader by the passport via the data of the machine-readable zone. This method is not protected against copying the key - once it is determined, it can be used to identify a passport. Even from a greater distance.

The contactless chip in the passport according to ISO 14443 will (naturally) be machine-readable and digitally signed as well as contain the biometric data. As the reading distance, Kügler mentioned a few centimeters, but pointed out that with current technology, reading from several meters away is possible. To ensure copy protection, the RFID chip should actively authenticate itself using an individual key pair, which is also signed.

Important here: the copy protection is handled by an active two-way authentication. A passport could therefore only be read with a stored key if it is actively involved. The keys then transmitted are so to speak bound to the respective communication - because both the passport and the reader would have their own key pair. This makes attacks via sniffing of the authentication significantly more complicated, as two key pairs must be cracked to do something with the data. Unfortunately, however, only the basic procedure is currently planned, i.e., only the keys per reader. And it gets worse:

Kügler rated the fingerprint as a highly sensitive feature. Therefore, access protection must be ensured by an active authentication mechanism (Extended Access Control). This was not defined in the ICAO standard and is therefore only usable for national purposes or on a bilateral basis.

Otto Orwell dreams of storing fingerprints - the procedure for how these must be secured is not yet defined and standardized. Such storage would therefore not be usable across the board. It is also important to ensure that only authorized devices are allowed to read. To this end, all readers would receive a key pair, which must be signed by a central authority. Anyone who has ever dealt with a certification authority knows that there must inevitably be a revocation list - a way to withdraw certificates. This is especially important for passport readers if, for example, they are stolen (don't laugh, devices also disappear at border facilities - hey, entire X-ray gates have been stolen from airports). Unfortunately, the experts see it differently:

In the subsequent short discussion, the question was asked whether a mechanism is provided to revoke the keys of the readers. Kügler indicated that this is not the case so far. However, it is currently under discussion to limit the validity of the keys temporally, but this has not yet been decided.

Hello? So there is no way to revoke a device's key. And there is - currently - no expiration of a key. If someone gains access to a reader, they have the key of the device and its technology at their disposal to read every passport in the vicinity. Without the possibility of getting rid of a device used improperly. This is like a computer system where there is no way to change the password and no way to delete a user - even in case of proven misconduct.

And once again, the extended check (and this key technology plus certificate in the reader is probably only intended for this) is only a proposal (which may not even be implemented due to the lack of interest of the Americans in the whole thing):

Kügler then described the BSI's proposal regarding Extended Access Control. According to this, an asymmetric key pair with a corresponding, verifiable certificate is generated for each reader (authorization only per reader). Therefore, the chip must be able to provide computing power for Extended Access Control. [...] Within the EU, access protection by Extended Access Control is currently only to be seen as a proposal, said Kügler. Another (unnamed) BSI colleague agreed with him and added that the Americans do not demand a fingerprint as a biometric feature on the chip at all, but rather the digital facial image would suffice for them. Only within America is a digital recording of the fingerprint planned. For this reason, the technical implementation of Extended Access Control is not urgent.

Only in this proposal is it provided that the devices receive unique key pairs and certificates based on them. Why is all this so critical now? Well, the discussion constantly focuses only on the data and the reading of the data - but these are not even that critical. Because even the stored fingerprints are not the complete fingerprints for reconstruction, but only the relevant characteristics for re-identification (although the discussion is still ongoing as to whether these stored characteristics are really unique - especially in the global context we are talking about - or whether more data does not need to be stored than in a purely national approach).

But what is always possible when we talk about such passports: the authentication and identification of a person. A two-way authentication can alone as authentication already say who is near me. If, for example, I have stored a key of a passport for the simplified procedure, I can then determine at any time without contact whether this passport is nearby - of course only within the framework of the security of the cryptographic algorithms, but that would already be a fairly secure confirmation, because it would be a pretty failure of the whole procedure if two passports with the same key allow an authentication and this has hopefully been excluded by the developers.

I can therefore obtain the keys of persons - for the simplified procedure, the machine-readable line of the passport is sufficient for this - for example, simply through simple mechanical means such as burglary, pickpocketing, social engineering, etc. - and store them. I can then feed a reader with this that, for example, in a defined area simply checks several passport data that interest me when passing through a gate - for example, a revolving door with a predefined speed is very practical for this. Only the passport with the corresponding data in the machine-readable zone will release its data for this, or provide confirmation of the authentication.

I could therefore, for example, determine when a person enters and leaves a building - without the knowledge of that person and fully automatically. With an authentication time of 5 seconds, you can already check several keys while someone walks through the revolving door.

Of course, this is still not the identification of the person - but only of the passport. But especially when the person being monitored does not know about the monitoring, the passport is worn by the person. There is no reason not to have the passport with you. And abroad, it is often a bad idea not to have your passport with you - so it is compulsorily near the person in these cases.

Well, but according to Otto Orwell, all this is just scaremongering and anyway not true and completely wrong. Unfortunately, it is based on statements by employees of the BSI - who are basically his people.

Schily considers data protection to be scaremongering

Privacy advocates' concerns are fear-mongering - at least according to Otto Orwell:

Concerns about biometric passports, RFID technology, and tele-surveillance, expressed for example by privacy advocates, are fear-mongering that one should not fall for, said Federal Interior Minister Otto Schily at the symposium "Computers in everyday life - opportunities for Germany" in Berlin. The mentioned technologies are not used to monitor or suppress citizens, but to increase their security.

Funny. I rather believe that Otto Orwell's talk is simply fear-mongering - what security is increased by massive and widespread spying on citizens? Certainly not the citizens' security - but they are being fed pseudo-risks and alleged solutions for them, just like the Bush administration, to reduce their civil rights in Germany. Without regard for facts, without regard for proportionality.

The ignorance he attributes to the critics is probably on his side. Because he may still be considered competent as a lawyer (I can't judge his competence there), he has no clue about cryptography and its risks - as they come into play, for example, in the context of passports valid for 10 years.

Who wants to make statements about the security of cryptographic methods today if they have to make this statement for a point in time 10 years from now? Yes, I know, Otto Orwell does - as I said, he simply has no idea what he is talking about. SHA1 was once described as a secure alternative to MD5 signatures - and has essentially failed. MD5 signatures are now completely unusable - as scientists have proven when they produced two real texts with meaningful content and identical MD5 signatures. I've had enough of pathetic politicians with brains too small, who want to impose their alleged doctrines on citizens with absurd claims. And I've long had enough of their idiotic argumentation loops with which they want to sell total surveillance as a security feature to citizens.

Off he goes, data protection

Because the interior ministers want to store connection data for one year. And the demands are very far-reaching:

The interior ministers' conference, meeting under the motto "Mit Sicherheit was los" (With certainty something is going on), expressed its support at its meeting on Friday in Stuttgart for a minimum twelve-month retention of telephone and internet data by telecommunications providers. The security experts, who consider this measure, which deeply encroaches on fundamental rights, particularly necessary in cyberspace.

The fact that this data desert violates data protection regulations and has so far always been rejected by the Bundestag is completely irrelevant to the interior ministers. And Schily already has concrete plans on how to circumvent this hurdle:

The SPD politician referred in Stuttgart to the plans for the blanket surveillance of users, which the national government representatives in Brussels are currently pushing forward via the EU Council, disregarding the EU Parliament. This involves obliging providers to retain all connection and location data for months and years, which arise during the provision of services such as telephoning, emailing, SMS sending, surfing, chatting or file sharing.

A very simple solution - let's use the undemocratic EU decisions, where a government can decide without the Bundestag. The federal government has already set an example with software patents. And then one can subsequently refer to the fact that one is merely implementing EU law. It may have nothing to do with democracy, but who cares. Democracy doesn't interest Otto Orwell and his colleagues anymore anyway.

Also nice to see how the interior ministers deal with the - justified - criticism:

Concerns from civil rights activists that the retention of data would mean that all electronic communication of people is monitored and that users are placed under a disproportionate general suspicion were dismissed by Rech. In his opinion, the term "glass citizen" is "overused".

If necessary, the data protection officers will simply be gagged, as Otto Orwell has already tried to do. The fact that the economy is massively against it because it will cause disproportionately high costs is also irrelevant to them. Absurd decisions in the name of alleged security and alleged malice of the internet have even stood up in court - as can be seen from the absurd blocking orders of the Düsseldorf government presidency. Fortunately, one is still allowed to report on it, as a court has recently ruled. For now. Otto will surely come up with something ...

The network must "not degenerate into a lawless space," explained Rech, referring to the often expressed fear of security politicians about allegedly unregulated online areas.

Sorry, but if the interior ministers' efforts succeed, the internet is a lawless space. Free from the right to informational self-determination. Free from data protection. Free from proportionality of means.

For me, one thing follows quite clearly: the focus on the user-friendliness of projects like gnupg, tor and mixmaster must be significantly increased on the client side, so that we have a chance at all to protect ourselves from this data collection mania of the interior ministers. Unless one wants to find one's own movement profile on the internet publicly available for download at some point or explain to the nice gentleman from the domestic intelligence service why one was on the left-wing radical website ...

The State Sees Everything

A note on the culture blog about a FAZ article on the tax identification number and the central register of the entire federal population based on it. Yes, everyone gets the tax identification number - even newborns. Comment from the culture blog:

The Federal Republic of Germany as a state is well on its way to generally suspecting and criminalizing every citizen, and those who carry out these measures are making themselves complicit in this development. 1984, Brave New World, and Globalia are calling.

Found via Zenzizenzizenzic

The Basic Rights Report 2005

shows how we are maneuvered around the Basic Law via back channels to gradually undermine our fundamental rights. Technical feasibility and data greed lead to an ever-increasing undermining of the framework set by the Basic Law. The Federal Constitutional Court thereby becomes a purely theoretical finger-pointer - because as we now know, even a ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court is not reason enough for the state apparatus to curb its desires.

Expanding Surveillance is the Goal

Federal Data Protection Commissioner criticizes eavesdropping compromise

"This contradicts the spirit of the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of March 3, 2004, which, emphasizing an absolutely protected core area of private life, declared significant parts of the previous provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the major eavesdropping to be unconstitutional," emphasized Schaar.

Well, the government, which is not even interested in the cross-party vote of the Bundestag against software patents, will probably not be interested in a judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court either - if it runs counter to their interests. And the Union - should the change take place - is not even satisfied with the measures and wants even more surveillance, even fewer rights for citizens, and even more data collection. While no criminals will be caught, political activism certainly advances one's career in politics - no matter how nonsensical the activism is.

The fatal aspect: our rights are not just being eroded - things that were hard and painstakingly achieved are being dismantled. These are damages that will probably not be repaired quickly - because once the data is available and the access possibilities are there, the state and the investigative apparatus will not want to back down. All this in the name of a pretended and alleged security for which there is no evidence.

Metaowl is life!

So, now the Metablog on data protection, informational self-determination, RFID and related topics is online:

http://metaowl.de/

If you want to participate, there is a participation description in the Metablog. Just check which way is best for you and sign up. Somehow we will integrate every content provider. A list of participating blogs and sources used is also online.

Of course, it works best and easiest if you can provide an RSS feed for your category - then I can directly take over the entries. But Technorati tags, blogg.de tags, del.icio.us tags (if you just want to provide pointers to interesting sites) or trackbacks also work. We just need something from which we can somehow extract an RSS feed (Atom is also fine), then it will work. If necessary, a script will be written that generates an RSS feed.

And one more request: feel free to link to the Metablog. It could use a bit of Google juice, we don't want only the cheerleading articles to be found when searching for data protection-related topics, do we?

And for those who just want to inform themselves about the topic: the Metablog has an RSS feed through which you will receive all the collected news. Or browse the archives - the search searches the full texts of the postings (of course only if the blog's RSS feed has provided them) - http://metaowl.de/ can therefore also be used as an interesting archive in the long run.

Off to the police state

German cabinet approves bill to expand DNA analysis:

... DNA analyses of individuals may in future also be stored if they have committed only minor offenses such as property damage or trespassing, or if it is expected that they will commit such offenses in the future. Furthermore, investigators will be granted the right to order DNA analyses in an expedited procedure without a judge having to approve them.

You participate in a demo that someone doesn't like? No problem, your data will be recorded and filed. Trespassing at a demo can happen quickly, property damage can be quickly attributed to you, and if you don't need to ask a judge, you can also move much faster. And so, a small and fine DNA database of all those unpleasant subjects will quickly be collected that a state really doesn't need - namely people who engage publicly and speak up.

What, civil rights are left behind in the process? Forget it, it doesn't interest Otto Orwell nor the combined incompetence in the Ministry of Justice.

Oh, and who believes that I am only paranoid, here is the case example cited by the Ministry of Justice:

A has been convicted because he repeatedly scratched the paint of motor vehicles with a screwdriver. The prognosis is that corresponding criminal offenses are also to be expected from him in the future.

Yes, you are a wheelchair user and you are upset about the idiotically parked drivers and have scratched the paint of one? Hey, you are still in a wheelchair and we simply assume that you will continue to get upset about the idiotic drivers - so off to the DNA file with the murderers, terrorists, and sex offenders. After all, you are at least as threatening to society as they are.

What kind of shit is this red/green puppet theater in Berlin getting us into. It is absolutely unbelievable.

And if you think it would be better with the Union:

... on the other hand, the proposed amendment to the DNA analysis by the CDU is by no means sufficient. "The bill is a step in the right direction. It is too short," said the deputy chairman of the Union faction, Wolfgang Bosbach. The Union will further tighten the existing legal situation in the event of an election victory, explained the interior and legal politician. There is no right for offenders to remain anonymous.

Who spontaneously thinks of recording every striking worker there is probably on the right track according to their idea ...

And all this from people who, under the guise of neo-liberalism, have written a reduction of the state to its core functions on their banner - and see surveillance, exploitation, and harassment of citizens as core functions.

We are moving straight towards something that can no longer be associated with a democratic society and a rule of law.

Clement will ALG-II recipients to be more strictly controlled

Clement will ALG-II-Empfänger schärfer kontrollieren and make social workers into agents. They are supposed to monitor benefit recipients more closely and snoop around after them. Because, of course, our biggest problem is not the 4.8 million missing jobs and not the thousands of further job cuts every month, but the few people who claim their household as a community of need.

And so the myth is further fueled that the problem is solely the unwilling and fraudulent unemployed. In Clement's eyes, it's all just scum, while he naturally vehemently defends himself against attacks on the economy he so loves.

And we can be sure that Clement will not have to receive unemployment benefits even after the defeat of Red/Green, because he has his share in the dry ...

Loud little Otto Orwells

Schily and Democracy

Well, Otto Orwell has messed up again: a Federal Data Protection Commissioner elected democratically (among others by his own faction) dares to take his role seriously and speak frankly about Otto's data collection mania. And already Otto attacks head-on, accusing him of having no political function and suggesting he should just keep quiet - what nonsense. The Federal Data Protection Commissioner has an important political function: he represents our (the citizens') interests in securing our data and upholding our right to informational self-determination. Among other things, against deranged and data-hungry interior ministers.

Great sign for a banana republic when the executive branch attacks parts of itself that have a controlling function. What's next - Eichel insults the Federal Audit Office as a bunch of bunglers who can't count?

But in the end, it probably just boils down to this: the dogs that are hit bark, of course ...

On Biometrics, Data Retention, Science, and Censorship

Found via rabenhorst and IsoTopp: How a conference organized by the BSI deals with critical voices - they simply remove them from the planning.

The BSI is an institution under the BMI - and thus our beloved Otto Orwell. Has someone at the BSI gotten cold feet that they could upset the actual master of the house?

Brussels heading for a showdown over data retention - yet another case where democracy and substantive concerns are simply ignored. Otto Orwell will be pleased, the citizens will have to bear the consequences. General suspicion of all EU citizens is indeed something fine, making the whole life of the investigators much easier - "in doubt for the accused" and other presumptions of innocence simply slow down too much when you are on your way to the police state ...

Easier access for intelligence agencies to accounts and travel data demanded - what is a right-wing agitator against informational self-determination and data protection actually doing in the SPD? Oh yes, I forgot, Otto Orwell is also in the SPD. Strange party, calls itself "social" and has a bunch of asocial people sitting in Berlin ...

Agreements on data retention cause outrage

heise online - Absprachen über Vorratsdatenspeicherung lösen Empörung aus

According to a result paper of the backroom talks with Deutsche Telekom, which is available to heise online, investigators and intelligence agencies are pushing for a storage period of 180 days for IP addresses and login data, the connection data in a landline call and in the mobile communications sector, in addition, the location identifier and "if necessary card number (IMSI) or identifier of the terminal device (IMEI)". Deutsche Telekom is said to have agreed to archive the corresponding personal data for this period. Currently, the company stores data for 90 days. Contrary to the requirements of the security authorities, Schily and Zypries are considering storing data for one year.

Great. The demands of the intelligence agencies are already absurd to the extreme - especially in mobile communications, this results in continuous tracking of all mobile subscribers - and Otto Orwell and the combined incompetence of the Ministry of Justice are even demanding more. Great democracy, I feel so safe with so much surveillance.

Orwell with Delay

Pläne für EU-Beschluss: Bundesregierung will das gläserne Handy - not only the mobile phone, but also email connection data, SMS connection data, etc. are to be stored centrally. What utter nonsense. On the one hand, it is absurd to create these amounts of data when only a tiny fraction of them is relevant to the authorities. On the other hand, it is even more absurd that this whole mess is paid for by tax money and indirectly by customers through the burden on companies. We are paying for our own surveillance.

It is always shocking how far this SPD government is willing to go to fulfill Schily's paranoia and the omnipotence fantasies of intelligence agencies and parts of the law enforcement authorities.

It is time to promote projects like tor, pgp, and similar services and combinations thereof (how about Internet telephony over tor, encrypted and signed with PGP keys?). Tor, in particular, plays an important role in hindering connection analysis. This general suspicion by the state is simply unacceptable.

However, it is a permanent mystery to me why allegedly left-wing politicians do not take notice when their proposals receive applause from prolethicians like Beckstein. Where are the supposedly concerned people who wanted to advocate for the interests of citizens? Where do they stand against the hardliner direction of Schily and his ilk?

Zypries will expand DNA tests

Zypries will DNA-Tests ausweiten

Moreover, Zypries wants to restrict the so-called judicial reserve: In the case of anonymous crime scene traces and with the consent of a suspect to the test, a judicial order would no longer be required.

Not only can a repeat burglar end up in the genetic database according to the draft - at least if the police think he might also do more than just burglaries (and to secure the data we simply suspect everyone) - but the last hurdle, namely the judicial decision, is also simply bypassed.

Otto Orwell is working on 1984 and the combined incompetence of the Ministry of Justice on the police state. I did learn that the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for the police and the Ministry of Justice for the courts, and that the separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary should also be reflected in these ministries, but that was probably just a rumor ...

In any case, both are working hand in hand to dismantle the liberal component of our democracy - more efficiently than any Union government. And the opposition is laughing at the stupidity of the government - they are doing all the things that a Union government would not have dared to do, as they would have had to fear re-election ...

Die Allmachtsphantastereien der Innenmister

junge welt vom 01.02.2005 - Die Datensammler flippen aus - jau, klasse Idee. Ordnungswidrigkeiten und Antiatomdemonstrationen sollen nach Beckstein, Schünemann und Schily zu gentechnischer Erfassung führen. Und weiter ab in den Polizeistaat, damit man schön die abweichenden Meinungen und das Lumpenproletariat unter Kontrolle hält. Weil dann sind wir ja alle so fürchterlich sicher.

Wer beschützt uns eigentlich wirksam vor durchgeknallten Politikern?

DNA-Analyse im Bundestag

DNA-Analyse im Bundestag [raben.horst] - und so bauen wir weiter am Polizeistaat. Egal das vom Verfassungsgericht die Verwendung von DNA Proben auf besonders schwere Straftaten beschränkt wurde. Egal das durch den genetischen Fingerabdruck - auch noch zwangsweise angeordnet - viel mehr Möglichkeiten als durch normale Fingerabdrücke möglich sind. Hauptsache die Hardliner kriegen ihren Überwachungs- und Kontrollfimmel bestätigt.

DNA-Analysen: Bayern startet Bundesratsinitiative

DNA-Analysen: Bayern startet Bundesratsinitiative - wer sonst wenn nicht die Bayern? Aktuelle Vorkommnisse werden als willkommener Anlass gesehen um schnell irgendwelche Änderungen durchzuprügeln. Egal das durch diese Änderung weitaus mehr als mit Fingerabdrücken möglich wird - und das viel mehr Missbrauchsmöglichkeiten vorhanden sind (z.B. Gen-Analyse zur Bewertung von Tauglichkeiten).

Auch das Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichtes das explizit DNA Analysen auf besonders schwere Verbrechen eingeschränkt hat wird dabei ignoriert. Wen schert auch das Bundesverfassungsgericht, wenn man mit Populismus so schön für Stimmung sorgen kann ...

Verpflichtung zur E-Mail-Überwachung trifft die Providerbranche hart

Tja, die Chili-Schote kriegt nichtmal die eigene Software gebacken, aber die Provider sollen ihm auf ihre Kosten die Mails der Kunden anliefern. Schon absurd was da immer noch abgeht. Und der Termin rückt näher.

Vielleicht sollten die Provider sich schlicht weigern und bei entsprechenden Klagen diese Weigerung beibehalten - wenn die Provider erst alle weggeklagt sind wird den Politikern vielleicht mal irgendwann auffallen wie bescheuert das ganze war - denn von den ausländischen Providern gibts garantiert keine für den Staat kostenlose Überwachung des Mailtraffics ...

Bei heise online news gibts den Originalartikel.

Mehr Überwachung gewünscht

Braucht noch jemand mehr Beweise für die grundsätzliche Dummheit der Menschen?

Als ob ein Überwachungsstaat mehr Sicherheit der Bürger bietet. Im Gegenteil. Die Terroristen sitzen dann nur an anderer Stelle: im Staatsapparat. Und nichts anderes ist das, was da gefordert wird. Eine totale Überwachung des öffentlichen Raumes. Eine Standard-Schuld-Vermutung aller Bürger - wer in der Öffentlichkeit herumläuft, öffentliche Verkehrsmittel benutzt oder auf öffentlichen Plätzen steht, ist grundsätzlich erstmal verdächtig. Wann wird der erste verurteilt, weil die Bewacher der Öffentlichkeit ihn beschuldigen? Wie viele versteckte, unsichtbare Zeugen wird es für unser Handeln in der Öffentlichkeit bald geben, deren Aussagen und Behauptungen wir nicht mehr widerlegen können, weil sie für uns nicht sichtbar und kontrollierbar sind?

Die Angriffe auf den privaten Raum haben wir ja auch schon durch Schily und Konsorten. Sicherer fühle ich mich durch den ganzen Unfug definitiv nicht ...

Schöne neue Welt. Wir selbst bauen uns unser 1984 ...

Bei heise online news gibts den Originalartikel.

c't aktuell-Lauschangriff vermasselt: Teilsieg für die Bürgerrechte

Weitere Reaktionen. Wenn man sich das ganze genauer anguckt, ist es wohl doch nicht so rosig. Rosig hingegen ist wohl die Brille durch die Schily guckt, anders kann ich mir nicht erklären, wieso er meint das der Lauschangriff als Verfassungskonform bestätigt worden wäre ...

Hier gibts den Originalartikel.